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Abstract: 
This study investigates the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and two alcohol-
related outcomes — liquor consumption and highway vehicle fatalities. Fixed-effect models are 
estimated for the 48 contiguous states over the 1975-1988 time period. Alcohol consumption and 
traffic deaths vary procyclically, with a major portion of the effect of economic downturns 
attributed to reductions in incomes, rather than employment. The intake of hard liquor is the 
most sensitive to the state of the macroeconomy. There is no evidence, however, that fluctuations 
in economic conditions have a disproportionate impact on the drunk-driving of young adults. 
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Article: 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Economic contractions are costly in many ways. Output declines, and job losers must frequently 
accept positions which are substantially inferior to those departed. For instance, five years after 
permanent layoffs, displaced workers earn ten to thirteen percent less than if the employment 
termination had been avoided (Ruhm, 1991) and unemployed individuals frequently lose health 
insurance coverage (Horvath, 1987). Other, harder to quantify, costs may include reduced 
opportunities for promotions, deteriorating working conditions, decreases in wealth, and higher 
crime rates. 
 
Local and national downturns may also adversely affect health. Seminal, but widely disputed 
analysis by Harvey Brenner (1975a, 1975b, 1979) suggests that recessions are associated with 
higher admissions to mental hospitals and increased mortality due to cardiovascular disease, 
cirrhosis, suicide, and homicide. The primary focus in this and related research is placed on 
psychological determinants, particularly increases in stress and risktaking. The lack of attention 
to economic factors is surprising given the substantial investigation of medical care, lifestyle 
choices, and health outcomes in the context of human capital investments (e.g., Grossman, 1972) 
and, more recently, of the economic determinants of addictive behaviors (e.g., Becker and 
Murphy, 1988; Akerlof, 1991; Chaloupka, 1991). 
 
Economic models treat health as one argument in the utility function. Health status is determined 
by stochastic shocks but also by economic factors such as changes in incomes and the relative 
price of medical care. Thus, health could deteriorate during economic slumps as earnings 
decrease and medical insurance is lost. However, since the utility function contains many other 
inputs, some of which indirectly affect health, it is possible that at least some aspects of health 
will improve. For example, ceteris paribus, falling incomes lower the consumption of normal 
goods such as drinking and driving, with the result that alcohol-involved traffic crashes may  
decline.
1
 By contrast, research focusing on psychological responses to local or national 
recessions suggests that drinking will increase, as self-medication for stress, and that there may 
be higher levels of risky behaviors such as drunk-driving. 
2
 
 
This study investigates the relationship between economic conditions and two alcohol-related 
health outcomes — liquor consumption and highway traffic deaths — which provide information 
on different dimensions of the relationship between drinking and health. Increased alcohol 
consumption need not adversely affect health, if concentrated among light drinkers. Most 
available evidence (e.g., Coate and Grossman, 1988), however, indicates that the demand of 
heavy drinkers is at  least as responsive as that of recreational users to changes in prices and 
incomes.
3
 This suggests that drinking problems are likely to be closely related to average 
consumption levels. Motor vehicle fatalities are employed as an indicator of alcohol-involved 
driving. Traffic crashes are the leading cause of injury deaths in the United States. 
Approximately one-half of these fatalities are alcohol-related (Zobeck et al., 1991), as are two-
thirds of those occurring at night (Herren et al., 1985). 
 
Previous examinations of the relationship between health and the macroeconomy contain 
potentially serious methodological problems. In time series analyses, trends in economic 
conditions are likely to be spuriously correlated with omitted factors that influence health. Cross-
sectional estimates also suffer from confounding, if unobservables affecting health are correlated 
with macroeconomic variables that differ across areas. As an alternative, this paper estimates 
fixed-effect (FE) models, using pooled time-series/cross-sectional data. Fixed-effect estimates 
reduce or eliminate the problem of confounding by exploiting within-state fluctuations in 
economic conditions that are independent of both national trends and cross-state differences in 
time-invariant unobservables affecting health. 
 
2. METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES 
Analyses using aggregate time-series data typically estimate some variant of the model: 
 
Yt= α + Xtß + Ztγ + εt,                                                                                                       (1) 
 
where Y measures health, Z is the indicator of economic conditions, X is a vector of covariates, 
and ε is an error term. For instance, in Brenner (1975a), health outcomes are proxied by  
 
1. Skog (1986) or Wagenaar and Streff (1989) provide evidence that liquor consumption is positively 
correlated with incomes. 
2. For example, Brenner and Mooney (1983, p. 1128) write: "recession increases the probability of a 
variety of losses and social changes that potentially threaten health. Attempts to alleviate psychological 
distress by medication with alcohol or legal and illegal drugs ... will tend to exacerbate existing morbidity and 
produce additional health problems. The psychological literature also allows for more complex labor market 
effects. For instance, some theories emphasize the stressful) nature of employment, suggesting that increased 
job-holding might raise liquor consumption (e.g. Wilsnack and Wilsnack, 1992 provide a summary or recent 
research examining the influence of employment on the drinking behavior of women). 
3. Leung and Phelps (1993) review recent research on the demand elasticity of alcohol consumption. 
Manning et al. (forthcoming) have recently used quantile regression techniques to examine how the price and 
income elasticities of alcohol consumption vary across light, moderate, and heavy drinkers. They find that 
price elasticities are the highest for moderate drinkers and lowest for heavy drinkers, while income elasticities 
are positive and significant for all groups. 
 
mortality rates, X includes controls for incomes and government spending, and Z is a vector of 
current and lagged unemployment rates. Brenner uncovers a strong positive correlation between 
unemployment and mortality, leading him to conclude that health varies procyclically. 
 
A number of researchers (Gravelle et al., 1981; Stern, 1983; Wagstaff, 1985) have pointed out 
serious technical flaws in Brenner's analysis and later studies which correct for these problems 
(Forbes and McGregor, 1984; McAvinchey, 1988; Joyce and Mocan, 1993) fail to replicate his 
findings.
4
 Instead, the results are sensitive to the choice of countries, the proxies used for health, 
and the time period analyzed. Significantly, elevated unemployment is frequently correlated with 
improvements rather than deteriorations in health. This fragility of results should not be 
surprising in light of the omitted variable and spurious correlation problems already referred to 
with aggregate time-series data.
5
 
 
Some (but not all) important covariates can be controlled for if microdata are used, however, 
doing so introduces other problems. In particular, unemployment can no longer be considered 
exogenous, since poor health may cause rather than result from joblessness. 
6
 Also, research that 
contrasts the health status of employed and nonemployed workers (e.g., Björkland, 1985; 
Hammarström et al., 1988; Moser et al., 1984) will capture only a portion of the total impact of 
changes in economic conditions, since recessions affect a broad cross-section of the working and 
nonworking population, not just those individuals experiencing unemployment.
7
 
 
As an alternative, this paper estimates fixed-effect models using pooled data for the 48 
contiguous states. The "true" model is assumed to be: 
 
Yit= αt + Xitß + Zitγ + Si + λit ,                                                                                           (2) 
 
where Yit is the value of the dependent variable for state i at time t, Z the measure of economic 
conditions, X a vector of other covariates, and λ is a "white noise" error term. The time-specific  
 
4. Criticisms include Brenner's method of choosing lag lengths, the hypothesized pattern of lag 
coefficients, choice of covariates, and the plausibility of his results. For instance, the strongest effects on 
mortality are observed for infants and the elderly, groups for whom employment status should be a 
relatively less important determinant of health. 
5. For example, much of the variation in unemployment during the four decades covered by 
Brenner's research is accounted for by dramatic reductions in joblessness following the end of the great 
depression. During this same period, mortality declined due to improvements in nutrition and increased 
availability of antibiotics. Failure to control for these factors leads Brenner to overstate the detrimental 
health impact of unemployment. 
6. See Janlert et al. (1991) for evidence. 
7. One advantage of microdata is that it will sometimes provide better (or at least different) 
information on the outcomes of interest. For instance, Kenkel (1993) and Mullahy and Sindelar (1994) 
have used answers to questions in the 1985 and 1988 National Health Interview Surveys asking "how 
many times during the past year did you drive when you had perhaps too much to drink to construct 
measures of drunk-driving. Since most instances of drunk-driving do not result in accidents, this variable 
is likely to pick up many cases of alcohol-involved driving not captured by vehicle fatality rates used in 
this paper. On the other hand, the self-reported measure is more likely to suffer from serious response 
biases. Consistent with the results reported below, both Kenkel and Mullahy & Sindelar uncover a 
positive correlation between employment and drunk-driving. 
intercept, α, accounts for time-varying characteristics that influence health and have changed in a 
uniform manner across the nation (e.g., changes in the maximum interstate highway speed limit).  
The state fixed-effect, S, controls for factors which vary across states but remain fixed (within 
states) over time. , therefore, measures the impact of intra-state deviations in economic 
conditions. Since the relative performance of state economies varies over time, the FE estimates 
largely avoid the aforementioned problems of confounding.
8
 
 
3. DATA 
The analysis below uses data for the 48 contiguous states over the 1975 through 1988 time 
period. 
9
 Two main outcomes are considered — alcohol consumption and highway fatalities. 
Information on the per capita consumption of beer, wine, and distilled spirits are from the U.S. 
Brewers' Association (various years).
10
 These data are used to calculate the total consumption of 
alcohol, in gallons of ethanol, using conversion factors provided by the National Institute of 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism's Alcohol Epidemiologic Data System. 
 
Since relatively few states test all drivers involved in accidents for alcohol impairment, proxy 
measures for drunk driving are required. This analysis considers both the total fatality rate (TER) 
and the nighttime fatality rate (NFR), where the latter is defined to include deaths resulting from 
accidents occurring between midnight and 3:59 A.M. Although a larger percentage of night-time 
deaths involve alcohol, the number of such accidents is considerably smaller, reducing the 
reliability of the estimates. Thus, it is unclear which of the two measures is preferred. Traffic 
fatalities are also separately broken out for youths (15-20 and 21-24 year olds), in order to 
consider age-variations in the impact of economic conditions. Data on traffic fatalities are from 
the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration's Fatal Accident Reporting System. 
 
Unemployment rates and the percentage of the population employed (hereafter referred to as the 
employment-to-population or EP ratio) are used as proxies for macroeconomic conditions. 
Unemployment rates furnish direct information on the ability of labor market participants to find 
jobs and have been widely utilized in previous research. EP ratios are used because some 
economists (e.g., Clark and Summers, 1982) believe that they provide a more accurate measure 
of labor market conditions, particularly for groups such as young workers who frequently  
enter and exit the labor force. Unpublished data on unemployment rates and EP ratios were 
provided by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics and refer to the noninstitutionalized civilian 
population aged 16 and over. Per capita incomes are sometimes controlled for, using U.S. 
Department of Commerce (1989, 1990) data. Some specifications are also estimated with the 
growth rate of Gross State Products (GSP) as the macroeconomic measure (with data obtained 
from the U.S. Department of Commerce, 1988, 1991). 
 
8. Fixed effect techniques were first used in alcohol research by Cook and Tauchen (1982) and 
Cook and Tauchen (1984) to indicate the impact of liquor taxes on heavy drinking and minimum drinking 
ages on vehicle mortality. More recently, DuMouchel et al. (1987) have employed FE models to evaluate 
the relationship between drinking ages and fatal crashes and Saffer and Chaloupka (1989) to study the 
impact of preliminary breath test laws. Evans and Graham (1988) provide a rare example of research 
using FE estimates to investigate the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and a health 
outcome (vehicle fatalities). 
9. Hawaii, Alaska, and the District of Columbia are excluded. 
10. I thank Frank Chaloupka for providing me with the data on liquor consumption, vehicle 
fatalities, minimum legal drinking ages, and beer taxes which are used in this analysis. 
The tax rate on 24-12 ounce containers of beer is the proxy for alcohol prices. Data on beer taxes 
are from the Brewer's Almanac. Information on taxes, rather than prices, is used because the 
former are determined independently of liquor demand, whereas an outward shift in the demand 
curve will increase both the price of alcohol and the quantity consumed.
11 
Numerous researchers 
have shown that higher alcohol taxes reduce drinking and related problems.
12
 
 
The minimum legal drinking age (MLDA) is controlled for since it is negatively correlated with 
liquor consumption and drunk-driving (Coate and Grossman, 1988; O'Malley and Wagenaar, 
1991) and exhibits considerable within-state variation during the sample period.
13
 The MLDA 
refers to purchases of beer with an alcohol content greater than 3.2%. Data on drinking ages are 
obtained from Wagenaar (1981/2) and various issues of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration's A Digest of State Alcohol-Highway Safety Laws.
14
 
 
Table 1 presents sample means and standard deviations for important outcome and explanatory 
variables, weighted by the population of adults (aged 16 and over) in each state. Gross state 
products, per capita incomes, and beer taxes are in 1987 dollars, with the implicit price deflator 
for GDP used to adjust for price changes. Consumption of beer, distilled spirits, and wine are in 
actual gallons, while total alcohol consumption is measured in gallons of pure ethanol. 
 
FE models rely on within-state variations in economic conditions and have the potential for 
improving on (aggregate) time-series analyses if there are substantial economic fluctuations 
across states. To show that this condition is met, Table 2 presents the squared correlation 
coefficient (R
2
) between individual states and the entire nation for unemployment rates, EP 
ratios, and changes in Gross Domestic Products. In the case of unemployment, the R
2
 is below 
0.5 (0.75) for 21 (33) of the 48 states on which the subsequent econometric analysis is 
performed. Similarly, the R2 is lower than 0.5 (0.75) for 9 (25) states for EP ratios and for 20 
(32) states when considering Gross State Products. 
 
4. ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
This section presents econometric estimates of the relationship between macroeconomic 
conditions and alcohol-related outcomes. Most of the results are for fixed-effect models but 
equations which exclude state and time dummy variables and those using national data are also 
included for comparison purposes. When considering drinking, the dependent variable is the 
natural log of gallons consumed. Since vehicle mortality is a rate, restricted to the range zero 
through one, logit models are estimated for this outcome. The dependent variable in the logit 
model is the natural logarithm of the odds ratio. The error term is heteroscedastic, with variance 
[Yit(1 — Yit)nit]
-1
, for nit, the population of state i at time t. Efficiency is, therefore, maximized 
by using weighted least squares, with cell weights [Yit(1 — Yit)nit]
1/2
. 
 
11. Saffer and Grossman (1987) discuss this issue in greater detail. 
12. Cook and Moore (1993) provide a detailed discourse on alcohol taxation. 
13. Twenty-eight states raised the legal drinking age between 1976 and 1988, a dramatic reversal 
of the downward trend observed during the early 1970s. 
14. Weighted averages are used to reflect changes in state taxes or MLDAs occurring during the 
middle of calendar years. 
 
 
4.1. Unemployment rates and alcohol outcomes 
Alternative specifications of a basic equation comparing unemployment rates (UN) and alcohol 
outcomes (Y) are shown in Table 3. The first column presents results of the model: 
 
Yt = α + UNtγ + Tδ + t ,                                                                                                 (3) 
 
estimated using time-series data for the entire United States, with T a quadratic time trend. This 
corresponds to the methodology of previous research using aggregated data. As discussed,  is 
likely to be biased due to spurious correlation between unobservable characteristics and 
unemployment rates. The second column displays estimates of: 
 
Yit = α + UNitγ + Tδ + it                                                                                                 (4) 
 
which uses pooled state-level data. Eq. (4) is roughly analogous to prior studies employing cross-
sectional information. Column (c) is the same as (b), except that the time trend is replaced with a 
set of year dummy variables, thus holding constant time-varying national factors which influence 
alcohol outcomes.
15
 The last two columns present results for fixed-effect models, which include 
a vector of state dummy variables. They differ in that column (e) controls for the beer tax rate 
and MLDA, whereas column (d) does not. 
 
The unemployment coefficients are sensitive to the specification chosen. FE estimates indicate 
that increases in a state's unemployment rate are correlated with lower alcohol consumption and 
fewer vehicle fatalities (see columns (d) and (e)).
16 
Substantially different results are obtained 
when considering national or cross-state variations. For instance, US unemployment rates are 
uncorrelated with alcohol consumption (column (a)), whereas the negative association is 
overstated when focusing upon differences between states (columns (b) and (c)). The former 
occurs because the strong concave trend in liquor consumption dominates any national business 
cycle effect. The latter is observed because liquor intake is persistently high (but presumably for 
reasons unrelated to economic conditions) in states with relatively elevated unemployment rates. 
These findings highlight the importance of using data containing multiple observations for each 
time period and controlling for unobserved fixed effects. 
 
As other researchers have found, beer taxes and MLDAs are inversely related to liquor 
consumption and vehicle fatality rates (see column (e)). Comparison of columns (d) and (e) 
shows, however, that the addition of these two key alcohol policies has virtually no impact on the 
estimated unemployment coefficients. This suggests that FE estimates of macroeconomic effects 
are robust to the choice of supplemental covariates. 
 
4.2. Fixed-effect estimates 
The econometric estimates in the remainder of the paper are variants of the FE model: 
 
Yit = αt + Xitß + Zitγ + Si + it.                                                                                        (5) 
 
15. For instance, changes in U.S. economic conditions or in the national sentiment towards drunk driving 
are controlled for. 
16. I also estimated a series of logit models where the dependent variable was the mortality rate due to 
cirrhosis of the liver. In this case, fixed-effect estimates fail to reveal a statistically significant effect of changes in 
joblessness. 
 
Yit represents the dependent variable for state i at time t, Z includes contemporaneous and 
sometimes lagged values of state economic conditions, α is a time- specific intercept (a vector of 
time dummy variables), S a time-invariant state effect (a vector of state dummy variables), X are 
the other covariates, and λ is the error term. Included in X are beer taxes, the MLDA, and, in 
some specifications, per capita personal incomes. 
 
Adding personal incomes to the set of explanatory variables will shift  towards zero if 
economic contractions partially affect alcohol outcomes by reducing earnings. The income 
coefficient is likely to understate the role of economic factors, however, because it does not 
account for changes in relative prices (e.g., the increased cost of medical care if employer-based 
health insurance is curtailed) or in the income distribution. Therefore, the unemployment 
coefficient continues to reflect both psychological influences and economic factors other than 
average incomes. 
 
Table 4 presents FE estimates with the unemployment rate used as the proxy for economic 
conditions and alternative lag specifications allowed for. There is little evidence that the 
inclusion of lagged regressors substantially improves the predictive power of the models. 
Previous unemployment is unrelated to alcohol consumption. For vehicle fatalities, the first and 
second lags have offsetting effects, with the result that the parameter on the current 
unemployment rate with lags excluded (column (a)) is virtually identical to the sum of the 
coefficients on UNt-2 through UN,, when all three are controlled for (column (c)). The remainder 
of the analysis, therefore, focuses on contemporaneous effects. 
 
Alcohol consumption and vehicle deaths are procyclical. The estimates in column (a) indicate 
that raising the unemployment rate from its mean value to one standard deviation above it (an 
increase of 2.12 percentage points) lowers predicted drinking by 1.3% and decreases traffic 
deaths by almost 7%.
17
 The importance of economic determinants is highlighted by noting that 
the unemployment coefficients are reduced by more than one-third for traffic fatalities and over 
two-thirds for liquor consumption when per capita incomes are controlled for (see column (d)). 
Furthermore, earnings are strongly positively correlated with both outcomes. For example, a one 
standard deviation increase in the state unemployment rate lowers predicted drinking by just 
0.4% in column (d) versus 1.3% in column (a). Ceteris paribus, a $1000 reduction in personal 
incomes decreases expected liquor consumption by 1.5%. 
 
The finding that drinking and traffic fatalities are positively related to economic conditions is 
robust to changes in the method of measuring the latter. For instance, substantially analogous 
results are obtained when the employment-to-population ratio, rather than the unemployment 
rate, is controlled for. As shown in Table 5, rising EP ratios are associated with increased 
consumption of alcohol and higher vehicle fatality rates (e.g., a one point rise in the percentage 
of the population employed elevates predicted liquor consumption by 0.8%, versus the 0.6% in-
crease expected if the unemployment rate falls by one percentage point). Much of the business 
cycle effect is again the result of income changes and the latter are positively correlated with 
both outcomes. Thus, the unemployment coefficient is cut approximately in half when personal 
incomes are controlled for and a $1000 increase in incomes is expected to raise alcohol  
 
17. Evaluating the other regressors at their sample means, the expected vehicle fatality rate 
declines from 2.03 to 1.89 per 10,000 persons.  
 
 
consumption by 1.2%. Similar results were obtained for a series of equations (not displayed) 
with changes in Gross State Products as the macroeconomic variable — the growth rate of GSP 
is positively related to both alcohol consumption and traffic deaths. 
 
4.3. Alcohol consumption 
The effects of the economic conditions on drinking vary markedly with the type of alcoholic 
beverage considered. This is shown in Table 6, which displays separate fixed-effect estimates for 
the consumption of beer, distilled spirits, and wine. The intake of hard liquor is by far the most 
sensitive to the state of the economy. A one percentage point increase in the state unemployment 
rate lowers the predicted consumption of spirits by over 1.1%, compared to just 0.4% for beer or 
wine (column (a)). A corresponding one percentage point reduction in the EP ratio decreases the 
expected intake of spirits, beer, and wine by 1.3%, 0.5%, and 0.9%, respectively (column (c)). 
 
The strong response of spirits consumption to macroeconomic conditions largely results from its 
relatively high income elasticity. A $1000 decrease in personal incomes lowers the drinking of 
distilled liquor by between 2.2% and 2.3%, depending on whether the unemployment rate 
(column (b)) or EP ratio (column (d)) is controlled for, whereas the decline is just 0.9% to 1.3% 
for beer and —0.5% to 0.5% for wine.
18
 One possibility is that reduced incomes decrease the  
relative demand for spirits because individuals shift drinking away from bars and restaurants, 
where liquor is relatively expensive and spirits are disproportionately imbibed, and towards 
consumption in the home, where beer is the drink of choice.
19
 To the extent that off-premise 
drinking is no longer followed by driving, this may help to explain the fall in alcohol-involved 
vehicle fatalities observed during downturns. 
 
18. Saffer and Chaloupka (1990) present evidence that price elasticities are higher for distilled 
spirits than for wine or beer, further indicating the relative sensitivity of spirits consumpition to economic 
factors. 
19. Average prices (per ounce of ethanol) of spirits are over twice as high as for wine and more 
than 70% above those of beer; alcohol is more than three times as costly on-premise as off-premise, with 
the greatest differential observed for spirits (Treno et al., 1993). Thus, when incomes fall, substitution is 
likely to occur away from spirits and towards off-premise use. 
 
 
  
4.4. Motor vehicle fatalities 
Further detail on traffic deaths is obtained by providing results for night-time, as well as total, 
fatalities and separate estimates for youths aged 15-20 and 21-24. Although teenagers and young 
adults are more than twice as likely as older persons to die in traffic accidents and are involved in 
fatal nighttime crashes three times as often (see Table 1), there has been no previous analysis of 
whether the sensitivity of drunk-driving to economic conditions varies with age. Results of the 
vehicle fatality equations are summarized in Table 7, with unemployment rates controlled for. 
Similar findings were obtained when EP ratios were used to proxy the macroeconomy.
20 
Bracketed entries show estimated elasticities of traffic deaths to changes in the unemployment 
rate. 
 
Although both types of traffic mortality decline as the macroeconomy worsens, the reduction in 
night-time deaths is only about half as large as for total fatalities. Thus, a one standard deviation 
increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a 7% lower TFR (from 23.0 to 18.9 per 
100,000 persons) but with just a 3% reduction in the NFR (from 4.16 to 4.04 deaths per 
100,000). Much of this difference is likely to reflect cyclical changes in driving patterns, 
whereby commuting to work and daytime pleasure driving are disproportionately reduced during 
economic contractions. Even when measured by the NFR, however, there is a small but 
statistically significant reduction in drunk-driving when the economy deteriorates. 
 
The patterns for 21-24 year olds are similar to those for the whole population, with modest 
evidence of greater cyclicality of night-time fatalities. The elasticity of the NFR to the 
unemployment rate is 0.098 for the full sample, compared to 0.117 for those aged 21-24. By 
contrast, total and night-time traffic fatalities of 15-20 year olds are less sensitive to changes in 
the macroeconomy than those of all adults or of 21-24 year olds. For example, the 
unemployment elasticity of the TFR is 0.23 for both the full population and those aged 21 to 24, 
versus 0.15 for 15-20 year olds (column (a)). 
 
Disparate income effects account for at least some of the difference across age groups. Night-
time vehicle deaths rise with incomes for 21-24 year olds and for the entire population but fall 
for those aged 15-20.
21
 Holding incomes constant, the NFR of 15-20 year olds is actually the 
most responsive to changes in unemployment rates — elasticities are 0.111 and 0.084, 
respectively, for 15-20 and 21-24 year olds, and 0.068 for all adults (column (d)). As discussed 
above, the consumption of spirits is particularly sensitive to the state of the economy. Since hard 
liquor is disproportionately consumed on premise and by mature adults, a decrease in incomes 
may, therefore, cause a relatively large reduction in drinking in commercial establishments and 
in the subsequent alcohol-involved driving of older persons. By contrast, youths primarily 
purchase beer for off-premise use and its consumption is relatively insensitive to macroeconomic 
conditions.
22
 
 
20. The main difference is even stronger evidence of procyclical changes in night-time fatalities for all 
individuals and for 21 to 24 year olds. 
21. These results must be interpreted cautiously, since the null hypothesis of no income effect can not be 
rejected at the .05 level of any of the three groups. 
22. For instance, in data from the Alcohol Supplement to the 1988 National Health Interview Survey 
(provided to me Gerald Williams of the Alcohol Epidemiologic Data System), 77% of 18-20 year old male drinkers 
report a preference for beer and only 10% for spirits. For 35-54 year old men the corresponding figures are 52% 
and 28%, respectively, and for men over the age of 75, 30% and 48%. Women are less likely to prefer beer at all 
ages but the same pattem of relative preferences is observed. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This study investigates the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and two alcohol-
related health outcomes — liquor consumption and highway vehicle fatalities. Fixed-effect  
models are estimated for 48 contiguous states over the 1975-1988 period. The analysis focuses 
upon within-state differences in economic conditions and most specifications include controls for 
individual year effects, beer taxes, and the minimum legal drinking age. Per capita personal 
incomes are sometimes held constant, to provide a crude indication of the portion of the total 
business cycle effect accounted for by changes in earnings. 
 
Fixed-effect specifications avoid many of the spurious correlation problems present in aggregate 
time-series or cross-sectional data. Comparison of results obtained for the three types of 
estimates shows that these biases are empirically important. For instance, the response of alcohol 
consumption to changes in unemployment rates is understated when using national time-series 
data. This occurs because liquor intake exhibits a strong concave time trend, during the period of 
analysis, which dominates any effect of fluctuations in the national economy. Conversely, 
macroeconomic effects are overestimated when pooled data are utilized but state fixed-effects 
are not controlled for. 
 
There is no evidence that drinking or risky driving rises during economic downturns. Instead, 
liquor consumption and alcohol-involved driving, as measured by either total or night-time 
vehicle fatalities, vary procyclically. A large proportion of the total impact can be traced to 
fluctuations in incomes, which demonstrates that drinking and driving are normal goods. 
Although liquor may be used as self-medication for increased stress, in aggregate, this effect is 
more than offset by lower incomes and (possibly) changes in relative prices. 
 
Two other findings are noteworthy. First, the consumption of distilled spirits is more sensitive to 
changes in the macroeconomy than is the drinking of either beer or wine. Second, although 
youths have much higher vehicle death rates than their older counterparts, there is no indication 
of greater responsiveness to economic conditions. Drinking patterns may explain these results. 
During downturns, consumers are likely to shift to cheaper sources of alcohol — from hard 
liquor to wine and beer and from bars and restaurants to drinking in the home. These movements 
will be less pronounced for youths, since most of their liquor intake is of beer and on an off-
premise basis during all periods. 
 
The investigation supplies strong evidence that economic conditions influence alcohol-related 
health outcomes through their impact on personal incomes and (possibly) relative prices. This 
finding may have implications for public policy. For instance, efforts to combat drunk-driving 
and to treat alcohol problems should probably be intensified during periods of rapid economic 
growth. As discussed above, however, the impact of the macroeconomy is likely to vary across 
different dimensions of health and, for many ailments, greater assistance may be needed during 
local and national downturns. Fixed-effect methods can be used in future research to examine the 
relationship between economic conditions and wide variety of health indicators. 
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